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I formulate a hybrid theory of perception, one in which the mind’s interaction with the 
world is a more direct affair than many suppose (no perceptual mental representations, no 
sense data, no Cartesian Theater), but one in which our concepts also play a role.  My 
claims have implications for philosophical attempts to understand perception, cognitive 
science theories of vision, debates over the nature of consciousness, and philosophical 
































Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger both put forth profound – and profoundly 
different – accounts of human cognition, accounts that called into question deep-seated 
assumptions of the philosophical tradition.  Further, Husserl and Heidegger took 
important and interesting stands on issues that have tremendous contemporary relevance: 
Cartesian dualism, the nature of consciousness, mental representation, and the role our 
concepts play in our perceptual experience.  There is a fundamental antagonism between 
the views of these two thinkers, and parallels to this antagonism constantly arise in 
contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, and cognitive 
science.   
This thesis – which consists of six chapters – attempts: (1) to describe the views 
of – and antagonism between – Husserl and Heidegger as regards several issues of 
contemporary relevance (such as the nature of consciousness and perception), (2) to show 
how analogues to this antagonism appear in contemporary debates surrounding the nature 
of vision and J. J. Gibson’s theory of direct perception in particular (Gibson’s view has 
several interesting similarities with Heidegger’s perspective), (3) to argue that the current 
debate surrounding the conceptualization of perceptual experience may be capable of 
settling several issues between Husserl and Heidegger (and Gibson and his critics), and 
finally, (4) to propose a possible reconciliation of sorts between the two broad 
perspectives delineated in this thesis.  Specifically, I argue for a conceptual – yet direct – 
perception, one in which our interaction with the world is a more basic affair than many 
hold it to be (no mental representations, no Cartesian Theater, no sense data), but one in 
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which our concepts are implicated.  My view has implications for several issues, 
including dualism, mental representations, and the nature of perception in general.   
In chapter one, I offer a brief overview of Husserl’s project, focusing upon what 
some commentators (Dreyfus (1982), Keller (1999)) refer to as his ‘methodological 
solipsistic perspective’ (i.e. Husserl’s desire to focus upon a pure and self-sufficient 
consciousness, initially leaving questions concerning the existence of external objects, 
other minds, etc. aside), before going on to discuss in some detail Husserl’s account of 
perception, which anticipated a modern debate in an interesting way.  Then, I offer a 
broad overview of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology, with a special 
emphasis on the Heideggerian notions of Being-in-the-World and instrumentality (or 
equipment).  I also gleam – from his scattered comments on the subject – Heidegger’s 
view of perception, which is of course drastically different from Husserl’s.  Finally, I 
briefly discuss the work of H. Dreyfus (1972, 92) as it relates to two central issues: (1) 
mental representations and (2) the ‘Cartesian Theater’ (Dennett’s (1991) term). 
In chapter two, I explore a recent manifestation of the antagonism between 
Husserl and Heidegger in cognitive science: the debate surrounding Gibson’s Direct 
Perception theory (Gibson 1950; 1979).  There are important differences between 
Heidegger and Gibson, differences which are illuminating in their own right (and will be 
discussed); nevertheless, there are undeniable affinities between the perspectives of the 
two thinkers.  Both argue for a direct interaction with the world (more accurately, both 
question the dualistic division between mind and world, at least at the most ‘basic’ level 
of investigation), both reject mental representations, and there is a striking similarity 
between Heidegger’s notion of ‘instrumentality’ and Gibson’s notion of ‘affordances.’  
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There are also differences between Husserl and Gibson’s critics (Fodor, Pylyshyn, 
Ullman); yet, Gibson’s critics put forth criticisms of Gibson that Husserl would have 
appreciated (for example, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) charge that on Gibson’s view, 
intentionality would be lost).  
In chapter three, I discuss a current debate centering on the interaction between 
our conceptual apparatus or framework and perceptual experience: can perception 
proceed without concepts, or is perception necessarily a conceptual affair?  I hold that the 
outcome of this debate has important implications for the debates discussed in the 
pervious two chapters.  If so, then this contemporary debate surrounding perception may 
have tremendous importance, as the debates in chapters one and two deal with some of 
the most important issues in philosophy and cognitive science: dualism, mental 
representations, consciousness, the nature of perception and so on. Then, in an attempt to 
develop the problematic in a little more detail, I argue that one can find good arguments 
for both sides in these debates, which perhaps suggests that the true view is a synthesis of 
the two views, one capable of keeping what is desirable in both views while 
simultaneously evading the criticisms each view directs at the other.   
In chapter four, I offer such a synthesis. Specifically, I formulate and argue for a 
view that combines a basic, unmediated interaction with the world with the notion that 
this interaction is guided by our concepts (in a manner too complex to discuss here), i.e. I 
argue for a ‘conceptualized direct perception.’ 
In chapter five, I expand upon the claims of chapter four by explaining the various 
ways in which perception can be conceptual.  I also discuss a philosophical ally of my 
view: J. McDowell.  This chapter demonstrates that my view, insofar as it is similar to 
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McDowell’s, has a certain amount of cash value, as it can solve a perplexing difficulty 
that arises from Sellars’ critique of the Myth of the Given.  
In chapter six, I return to the two thinkers with which I began: Husserl and 
Heidegger.  Specifically, I briefly show that the synthesis offered in chapter four would 




















CHAPTER 1. HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER ON PERCEPTION 
Here, I compare and contrast the perspectives of Husserl and Heidegger.  After 
discussing Husserl’s ‘methodological solipsistic perspective’ (Dreyfus 1982, Keller 
1999), I discuss his account of perception.  Then, I discuss Heidegger’s critique of 
Husserl, before briefly discussing Heidegger’s rejection of mental representations (and 
M. Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the Cartesian Theater) via appeal to the work of H. 
Dreyfus (1972; 92).  
1.1 HUSSERL 
1.1.1 HUSSERL’S METHODOLOGICAL SOLIPSISM 
The subject matter of phenomenology was to be, at least at the initial stages of inquiry, a 
pure and self-sufficient consciousness; ‘phenomenological psychology is meant to make 
the life of the psyche, that is, of consciousness, taken in its pure…essential structures 
[perception, memory, imagination etc], the universal and consistent theme of 
investigation’ (Kockelmans 1994, p. 120) (see Husserl 1925).  To delimit the proper 
sphere of phenomenological inquiry, all questions concerning ‘the ultimate referent of 
expressions and mental acts’ (Keller 1999, p.40), i.e. the non-psychical physical world, 
must be set aside. Or, to achieve a pure consciousness that can serve as the object of 
phenomenological inquiry, we ‘must put between brackets as non-psychical the general 
thesis of our natural attitude, according to which the real world about me is at all times 
known as a fact-world that has its being out there’ (Kockelmans 1994, p.120).  In short, 
we must suspend or place in brackets the ‘natural attitude’ (i.e. the assumption that there 
is an external world out there that actually exists etc) if we are to obtain a pure 
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consciousness that can serve as the object of phenomenological inquiry.  The act though 
which a pure consciousness is obtained is known as the ‘phenomenological reduction.’ 
 After the phenomenological reduction is performed, consciousness is still defined 
by its intentional nature, i.e. consciousness is still a consciousness of something, but now, 
this something is ‘not to be taken as a being in the real world but exclusively as that 
which is intended by consciousness’ (Kockelmans 1994, p. 121). That is, we are no 
longer concerned with objects in the world, but rather, in how those objects are presented 
to us in consciousness.  The various structures of consciousness are, as alluded to above, 
thought to be acts that give (and completely determine) the object that is intended to.  I 
now turn my attention to Husserl’s account of one of these structures: perception.     
1.1.2 HUSSERL’S ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION 
Husserl developed a rather complex and detailed account of perception, some key terms 
of which include: ‘authentic appearance,’ ‘intuitive givenness,’ and ‘signitive 
representation.’  I now define these terms.   
 Husserl held that a perceptual object is given as a series of mutually consistent 
one-sided perspectives; Husserl’s ‘first and most important observation concerns the 
circumstance that spatial objects are never fully given in intuition with respect to all of 
their sides and characteristics,’ rather, ‘only certain sides or aspects come to be seen in 
the visual perception of a thing’ while other aspects ‘fall entirely outside of the field of 
vision’ (Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1993).  This fact was a source of puzzlement to 
Husserl, and motivated much of what he said about perception, for the following reason: 
even though we only see a partial, one-sided perspective of an object, it is to the entire 
object, and not a mere one-sided perspective, that we intend.  In perception, we somehow 
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jump from a one-sided perspective of an object to the entire object as regards 
intentionality.  The burning question now becomes: ‘how, then, is the absence of that 
which I cannot actually see nevertheless present in my seeing?’ (Bernet, Kern and 
Marbach, 1993).   
 Husserl’s term for when a visual object is given or seen as a one-sided perspective 
is ‘authentic appearance.’  An intentional act of perception that gives an authentic 
appearance is said to be an intentional act insofar ‘as and to the extent that this act is 
interwoven with corresponding sensational data’ (Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1993).  
‘Inauthentic appearance’ is that part of an intentional object that lacks corresponding 
sensational data.  For example, authentic appearance is a one-sided perspective of a table 
(here, sense data is present), while inauthentic appearance is the rest of the table that is 
not given as sense data (or one-sided perspective) but is intended to nevertheless.  
Inauthentic appearance is the gap, so to speak, between authentic appearance and the 
entire intentional object. 
 Authentic appearance is said to be one mode of  ‘intuitive givenness,’ i.e. a one- 
sided table perspective is given in the ‘intuition.’  Authentic appearance ‘is to be 
distinguished on the one hand from other modes of intuitive givenness in which the 
object is not given itself but is rather given by means of an image;’ further, authentic 
appearance is also distinct ‘from modes of givenness in which the object as such is given 
not in the intuition but merely by means of a (conventional) sign representing the object’ 
(Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1993).   
 This unintuitive givenness of an object by means of a sign is ‘signitive 
representation.’  Husserl ‘does not regard the signs of a linguistic expression for their 
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own sake but understands them as signitive representatives’ of objects (Bernet, Kern and 
Marbach 1993).  Husserl posits a ‘semantic intention’ whereby an intentional act relates a 
sign to the signified, an act that infuses the sign with a specific content.  This process is 
‘accidental’ in that I could have looked at a different object of the same type, while 
authentic appearance is never accidental (as authentic appearance gives ‘the object itself, 
inasmuch as and to the extent that it is intuitively given’) (Bernet, Kern and Marbach 
1993).   
 With all of these terms now defined, we can return to Husserl’s initial puzzle: 
how can we intend to an entire object when only a part of the object is given in authentic 
appearance?  Husserl gives the following answer: ‘a full act of perception or the full 
appearance of a thing, that is, the unity of authentic appearance and inauthentic 
appearance’ is a ‘sum of diverse forms of representation, or it is a “mixed” form of 
representation, at once intuitive and signitive’ (Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1993).  We can 
intend to an entire object – although only a one-sided perspective of the object is given as 
authentic appearance – because the entire intentional object (given in a full act of 
perception) is an amalgam of the one-sided perspective and signitive representation.  A 
visual object as perspective helps imbue a sign with a specific (yet accidental) content, 
while the sign in turn ‘fills in’ the rest of the object (i.e. that part of the object not given 
as sense data).  In short, ‘signitive representation brings to givenness the sides of a thing 
which are not intuitively given in perception’ (Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1993).  What 
Husserl is in effect saying is that a full act of perception is a conceptual act in a sense, 
because the sign or concept is what makes the intentional object whole.  (See also 
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Dreyfus (1982); where Dreyfus speaks of Husserl’s ‘conceptualized’ account of 
perception.)      
 To summarize: we have now been introduced to several important aspects of 
Husserl’s thought, all of which will play an important role throughout the remainder of 
this thesis: (1) Husserl embraced ‘methodological solipsism’ (the belief that 
consciousness can be studied apart from the world), (2) Husserl, like may before and 
after, believed in sense data, and (3) Husserl believed that perception was inherently a 
conceptual activity.   
1.2 HEIDEGGER 
1.2.1 HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND 
EQUIPMENT 
 
First, before I discuss Heidegger’s critique of Husserl, I discuss his critique of Cartesian 
dualism, a view that Husserl himself had a profoundly complex and frequently changing 
relationship to (one that is too complex to discuss here; see Husserl (1960, 1970), see also 
Langrebe (1970)).  While Cartesian dualism – understood here as the view that posits a 
self-conscious subject standing over against an objective reality – served as the spine of 
modern philosophy, Heidegger held that dualism wasn’t the sole, or even the most 
fundamental, account of human existence or cognition.  As an alternative, Heidegger 
posited the notion of Being-in-the-World, a view of human existence in which the subject 
and object of the old view are intertwined to such a degree that it is no longer possible to 
differentiate the two, or even to say that there are in fact two divergent entities in the first 
place.  The conscious, reflective subject of dualism is replaced with what Heidegger 
terms ‘Dasein,’ a word that means everyday human existence in colloquial German 
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(Dreyfus 1991, p.13) and is to be understood as being more basic than mental states or 
anything mentalistic in general (Dreyfus 1991, p.13).  Heidegger (1962, p.297) writes: 
Self and world belong together in the single entity Dasein.  Self and world 
are not two entities, like subject and object…but self and world are the 
basic determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of Being-
in-the-World.  
   
Dasein is also a drastic departure from Husserlian ‘consciousness.’  First and foremost, 
Husserl’s self-sufficient consciousness (or any notion of consciousness whatsoever), and 
the refusal to acknowledge the non-psychical physical world (at the initial stages of 
phenomenological inquiry), are rejected; Dasein is not comprehensible or possible apart 
from the world.  That is, Heidegger rejected ‘methodological solipsism.’ 
Further, the type of intentionality that characterizes Dasein is drastically different 
than Husserlian intentionality. Dasein, at the level of Being-in-the-World, does direct 
itself at objects through what Heidegger called ‘comportment,’ but comportment is not 
Husserlian intentionality insofar as it is attributed to Dasein and not consciousness, and is 
not associated with anything mentalistic in general (Dreyfus 1991, p. 51).  
 The notion of Being-in-the-World can most readily be explicated through appeal 
to Heidegger’s notion of ‘equipment.’  At the level of Being-in-the-World, at the level of 
Dasein’s everyday coping with the world (as opposed to the Cartesian subject’s detached 
theoretical attitude), Dasein is directly involved with or immersed in the world.  While 
coping with the environment (which we are directed at through comportment), Dasein is 
often directly and unreflectively engaged in some task or practical activity.  While 
engaged in such activity, Dasein encounters beings that can be utilized to complete the 
task that Dasein is currently up to; these beings are termed ‘equipment.’  Equipment is 
defined – or reveals itself to us – only insofar as it can be put to immediate unreflective 
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use by Dasein; a piece of equipment is said to be a ‘something-in-order-to-x,’ where x is 
a given task.  In sum, Dasein – at the level of practical activity – is directly immersed in a 
world of objects that reveal themselves to Dasein only insofar as they can be put to 
immediate unreflective use to complete the practical task that Dasein is currently engaged 
in; here, there is nothing that can be said to resemble the detached, reflective, Cartesian 
subject (i.e. here, there is no dualism).  (See Heidegger 1962, pgs. 164 and 293.) 
 To continue, it makes no sense to speak of a single piece of equipment; rather, a 
piece of equipment always fits into a larger nexus of equipment. In short, 
‘Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is in terms of 
it belonging to other equipment: inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, 
table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room’ (Heidegger 1962, 97). 
 
As a concrete demonstration of Dasein utilizing equipment, Heidegger gives the famous 
example of a carpenter hammering nails.  When a skilled carpenter is actively engaged in 
the task of hammering nails, the carpenter doesn’t consciously or self-consciously stand 
over against the hammer and nails etc. as a disinterested subject (or as a mentalistic 
entity), reflecting on each stage of the task or on what to do next; rather, the carpenter 
unreflectively utilizes the hammer (or the ‘in-order-to-drive-the-nail’) as a piece of 
equipment to complete the task Dasein is currently up to.  Not only is there not a 
detached Cartesian subject here, we also don’t see a Husserlian consciousness here, as 
Dasein is not a mentalistic entity.  Further, we don’t see Husserlian intentionality insofar 
as (1) it is Dasein that is directed (through comportment) at the task, and (2) Dasein is 
utilizing a mere piece of equipment (an ‘in-order-to-drive-the-nail’) as opposed to a full 
fledged object seen through the guise of a concept (‘hammer’). 
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 Now, imagine that something goes wrong with the task; perhaps the hammer 
breaks, or the hammer is too heavy, etc.  At this point of malfunction or breakdown, the 
carpenter may find herself consciously reflecting upon the situation; that is, a disturbance 
or jolt in the normal flow of practical activity may result in the emergence of a subject 
consciously reflecting upon the world in a theoretical manner.  In short, when a problem 
arises, a reasoning subject emerges – one capable of dealing with the problem.  Here we 
see an essential point: Heidegger didn’t outlaw dualism or theoretical cognition per se; 
rather, he delineated a more basic sphere of practical activity (the ‘basicality’ of which 
will be explored below) where dualism didn’t apply, but could arise through a 
malfunction of some sort.  
1.2.2 HEIDEGGER ON PERCEPTION 
There is one issue that needs to be addressed, as it will play a crucial role later on: what 
role does perception play in Dasein’s active – practical (i.e. non-theoretical) – 
engagement with the world?  Heidegger is quite clear that theoretical perception – that is, 
a perceptual experience in which a disinterested yet self-conscious subject stands over 
against an objective world, or a perceptual experience reminiscent of the Husserlian 
account where our concepts are involved, etc. – is not present in our unreflective coping 
with the world.  For Heidegger, ‘just as action absorbed in the world does not involve an 
experience of acting, a mental state self-referentially causing bodily movement, so, 
perception doesn’t involve a visual experience: I am simply fascinated by and drawn into 
the spectacle of the world’ (Dreyfus 1991, p.58).  That is, perception, too – as it exists in 
our skillful, unreflective coping with the world – is not something that we consciously 
experience or reflect upon; rather, we simply perceive the world unreflectively. 
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 Now, it seems that while perception for Heidegger (during practical activity) is 
not a self-conscious or conceptual activity, it is present in some sense, in the sense that 
we at least have to open our eyes when coping with the world (so we can in fact become 
‘fascinated by and drawn into’ the world (Dreyfus 1991)).  
 To approach this from another angle: imagine a skilled and normally sighted 
carpenter trying to actively cope with the everyday world with her eyes closed.  It seems 
that the carpenter’s normal, unreflective immersion in the task at hand would be 
constantly interrupted, as she would constantly be tripping over things, losing things, etc.  
The carpenter’s day would be one constant malfunction, so, the carpenter would almost 
be habitually thrown into the theoretical attitude.  That is, while absorbed skillful coping 
may not in fact require a reflective or theoretical attitude or subject (as Heidegger 
asserts), it seems that it does require that Dasein at least open its eyes while completing 
the task it is currently up to. A lot will hinge on this point later on.  
1.2.3 THE EMERGENCE OF TWO PERSPECTIVES 
We now have two sharply contrasting accounts of cognition (and perception in 
particular): (1) we have Husserl’s phenomenology, which sought to study a self-sufficient 
consciousness (at least at the initial stages of investigation), where perception, for 
example, was a rather highbrow affair where our concepts played a role, and (2) we have 
Heidegger’s perspective, which held that Husserl’s account of cognition was only viable 
at the level of theory, as there was a more basic, more primary account of human 
cognition, one that focused on the level of unreflective practical activity. At the level of 
practical activity, concepts played no role: perception was merely an unreflective 
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openness to the world.  We’ve also seen how Heidegger’s account was also a critique of 
Cartesian dualism.  
 Now, I’ve remarked several times that Heidegger’s sphere of practical activity is 
more basic than – or prior to – theoretical cognition in some sense, but is this claim 
justified?  As Dreyfus (1991, p.85) points out, Heidegger makes no direct or explicit 
claim that practical activity is prior to theoretical cognition; however, there are two points 
that Heidegger might make to argue for this claim.  First, it may be the case, or it is 
possible in principle, that Dasein could always remain actively involved with the world.  
That is, there is nothing in principle that necessitates the emergence of a conscious, 
reflective subject; perhaps there is a utopia where nothing ever malfunctions (Dreyfus 
1991, p.85)?  Second, it seems that ‘in order to act deliberately we must orient ourselves 
in a familiar world,’ so, ‘all thematic intentionality must take place on a background of 
transparent coping,’ i.e. as Husserlian intentionality requires a background of practical 
familiarity, it follows that practical familiarity is prior to Husserlian intentionality 
(Dreyfus 1991, p.85). 
 Finally, in the interest of clarity, it is important to note that while practical activity 
may have some sense of priority over theoretical cognition, in the sense that perhaps 
practical activity can exist without theoretical cognition but not vice versa, Heidegger 
does not believe that theoretical activity can be completely reduced to practical activity.  
The two spheres of cognition are, and must remain, distinct.  Heidegger’s true aim was to 
demonstrate, contrary to post-Cartesian philosophy, ‘that neither practical activity nor 
contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient mind 
and an independent world’ (Dreyfus 1991, p.49). 
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1.3 DREYFUS 
H. Dreyfus, arguing from a perspective that is heavily influenced by continental thinkers, 
has been a persistent critic of (Symbolic) Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science.  
Dreyfus feels that many of the traditional philosophical assumptions that Heidegger (and 
M. Merleau-Ponty) overthrew are alive and well, and causing confusion and stagnation, 
in A.I. and Cognitive Science.  I now discuss two of Dreyfus’ most important critiques in 
detail: (1) his critique of mental representations (a discussion that also allows me to 
discuss a further aspect of Heidegger’s critique of the tradition, his rejection of mental 
representation), and (2) his critique of the Cartesian Theater.  
1.3.1 DREYFUS’ CRITIQUE OF MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE 
CARTESIAN THEATER 
 
In ‘What Computers Can’t Do (a Critique of Artificial Reason),’ H. Dreyfus (1972, 92) 
launched an attack on what J. Haugeland has called GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned A.I.), 
that is, the attempt to model intelligence by using rules to manipulate symbolic 
representations of the world.  Dreyfus (1992) states:  
My work from 1965 on can be seen in retrospect as a repeatedly revised 
attempt to justify my intuition, based on my study of Martin Heidegger, 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the latter Wittgenstein, that the GOFAI 
research program would eventually fail.  
 
The A.I. community’s reception of Dreyfus’ work has changed somewhat over time; 
discussing the work done at the MIT A.I. Lab, T. Winograd (1989) relates that for 20 
years, those at the MIT Lab were ‘overtly hostile to recognizing the implications of what 
he (Dreyfus) said,’ but more recently, ‘some of the work being done at that laboratory 
seems to have been effected by Heidegger and Dreyfus.’ 
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 There are several facets to Dreyfus’ critique of GOFAI – for example, an 
emphasis on the need for a holistic treatment of knowledge and facts, an emphasis on the 
importance of our bodies to our everyday activities – but a main pillar of his critique is 
his Heideggerian inspired attack on mental representations.  The thought is that we rarely 
(if ever) use mental representations to cope with the world, so why should A.I. be based 
upon them?   
 Dreyfus (1992) traces the germination of the mental representationalist view back 
to rationalists such as Descartes and Leibniz, who ‘thought of the mind as defined by its 
capacity to form representations of all domains of activity.’  Further, ‘these 
representations were taken to be theories of the domains in question, the idea being that 
representing the fixed context-free features of a domain and the principles governing their 
interaction explains the domain’s intelligibility’ (Dreyfus 1992).  Dreyfus (1992) holds 
that, ‘on this view, all that we know – even our general know-how for getting around in 
the world and coping with things and people – must be mirrored in the mind in 
propositional form,’ and ‘underlying everyday understanding is a system of implicit 
beliefs.’  ‘Common sense’ comes to be seen as being derived from a ‘vast database of 
knowledge,’ a view that manifests itself in the work of D. Lenant, for instance, who is 
attempting to build a vast database of everyday facts with the hope that the database can 
be used to generate intelligence in a machine (Dreyfus 1992).  In sum, Dreyfus argues 
that this view is an inadequate account of human cognition, and he implicates this 
inadequacy in the failure or stagnation of GOFAI, which was largely based on this view. 
 The positive view that Dreyfus puts forth is a Heideggerian inspired account of 
how our intelligent behavior arises, an account that forsakes mental representations.  
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Dreyfus’ discussion of ‘interactionist A.I.’ – one of the ‘Heideggerian inspired’ 
approaches to A.I. mentioned above, and a form of A.I. that Dreyfus favors over GOFAI, 
displays many aspects of the view of intelligence that Dreyfus advocates.  Two 
innovators in the field of interactionist A.I. are Agre and Chapman; both ‘question the 
need for an internal symbolic model of the world that represents the context-free features 
of the skill domain’ (Dreyfus 1992).  In a move Heidegger would approve of (see above), 
Agre and Chapman ‘note that in our everyday coping we experience ourselves not as 
subjects with mental representations over against objects with fixed properties, but rather 
as absorbed in our current situation, responding directly to its demands.’  In short,  
‘interactive A.I. takes seriously the view [Dreyfus] attributed to Heidegger 
in [‘What Computers Can’t Do’] – that there is usually no need for a 
representation of the world in our minds since the best way to find out the 
current state of affairs is to look at the world as we experience it’ (Dreyfus 
1992). 
 
A further aspect of interactionist A.I. that Dreyfus approves of concerns the adoption of 
his and S. Dreyfus’ thesis (in ‘Mind Over Machine’) that ‘behavior can be purposive 
without the agent having in mind a goal or purpose’ (Dreyfus 1992).  Agre and Chapman 
argue that complex behavior can arise without the need for ‘a complex control structure 
to decide for you what to do’ (Agre and Chapman).   
In criticizing the notion of a central structure in the human mind (that consciously 
works toward the achievement of a goal), Dreyfus (1998) is influenced by M. Merleau-
Ponty, an influence developed in articles such as ‘Intelligence Without Representation.’  
Here, Dreyfus explains the acquisition of a skill, breaking the process down into several 
stages (novice, advanced beginner, competence, proficient, and expertise).  The beginner 
is given rules, ‘like a computer program,’ but as we progress through the stages towards 
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expertise, rules and plans (and representations) become less important as the performer 
executes the task in a more efficient, more intuitive, and less self-conscious manner 
(Dreyfus 1998).  Dreyfus states, ‘Merleau-Ponty points out that an action can conform to 
conditions of satisfaction without the agent having these conditions in mind as a goal,’ 
and ‘Merleau-Ponty goes on to claim that this non-representational form of activity is a 
more basic kind of intentionality, missed by the reconstructions of what he calls 
“objective thought,”’ where ‘objective thought’ is ‘one’s standing over against an 
independent object and then finding out about it’ (Dreyfus 1998).   
 To continue, ‘according to Merleau-Ponty, in absorbed skillful coping, I don’t 
need a representation of my goal,’ instead, ‘acting is experienced as a study flow of 
skillful response to one’s sense of the situation’ (Dreyfus 1998).  This ‘sense of the 
situation’ is a Gestalt-like sense of the overall circumstances of the situation.  Dreyfus 
(1998) gives the example of a tennis player:  
when things are going well, and one is absorbed in the game, what one 
experiences is more like one’s arm going up and down and its being drawn 
to the appropriate position, the racket forming an optimal angle with the 
court – an angle we need not even be aware of – all this so as to complete 
the gestalt made up of the court, one’s opponent, and the oncoming ball. 
 
Indeed, this situation is so complex it doesn’t seem to be something ‘one could represent’ 
(Dreyfus 1998).  In short, ‘whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our body is 
not an object for an “I Think,” it is a grouping of lived through meanings which moves 
towards its equilibrium’ (Dreyfus 1998).   
 There seems to be an interesting connection between the two ideas Dreyfus is 
criticizing: a central ‘I Think,’ in order to perform its function, would seem to need a 
representation of the world.  If a central ‘I Think’ is to delegate responsibility, and send 
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orders to the entire body (such as ‘move arm up to a 45 degree angle to hit tennis ball’), 
then it seems there must be a representation of the entire situation to which the central ‘I 
think’ can appeal (so it knows what angle the arm in fact needs to be moved to).  I will 
return to these issues in more detail below when I argue that the notion of sense data, a 
central ‘I Think’ (or a ‘Cartesian Theater’), and mental representations all go hand in 
hand.        
1.4 SUMMARY 
To summarize the main ideas of this chapter: we’ve met several aspects of Husserl’s 
thought, including (1) his emphasis on consciousness, (2) his methodological solipsism, 
(3) his belief in sense data, and (4) his belief that perception is conceptual.  We’ve also 
met Heidegger’s critique of Husserl: Dasein cannot be studied apart from the world, and 
is not a mentalistic entity.  Concepts have no role in perception (at least prior to the 
emergence of theoretical cognition). 
 Further, we’ve seen how Heidegger criticized two important aspects of the 
philosophical tradition: (1) Cartesian dualism and (2) mental representations.  Finally, 
we’ve seen how Dreyfus, influenced by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, has criticized 
(Symbolic) Artificial Intelligence for adhering to positions that, according to him, 







CHAPTER 2. VISION 
Now that I’ve introduced the broad perspectives of Husserl and Heidegger, and some 
points of antagonism between them, I turn to a recent debate that has affinities between 
the antagonism between Husserl and Heidegger: the debate over J. J. Gibson’s (1950, 
1979) theory of direct perception.  First, I introduce Gibson’s theory via comparison with 
Heidegger.  While Gibson was not influenced by Heidegger (or vice versa), and while 
there are several important differences between the two thinkers (some of which will be 
discussed), there are some striking similarities between the two thinkers. I then discuss 
two lines of criticism directed at Gibson’s project, one by Ullman (1980) and the other by 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981).   
2.1 GIBSON’S THEORY OF DIRECT PERCEPTION AND HEIDEGGER 
In 1950, James J. Gibson published The Perception of the Visual World, a radical and 
controversial book that helped inaugurate the research program of ‘direct perception.’ 
Gibson held that ‘organisms are so constituted, and live in a world so constituted, that 
they will readily gain the information they need to survive and thrive’ (Gardner, 1985: all 
quotations from pgs. 308-22).  Perception needs no recourse to inferential steps 
(conscious or unconscious), intervening variables or associations (Zawidizki).  Perception 
needs no recourse to mental processes or operations, or models or interpretive schema.  
That is, in the attempt to understand vision, there is no need to posit the very notions that 
lie at the foundation of modern cognitive science (and, as we saw above, Symbolic A.I.).  
 Struck by the surprising amount of information that is ‘available to the visual 
sense alone, Gibson arrived at extreme skepticism about the whole computational 
approach’ in modern psychology and cognitive science (Gardner 1985).  Gibson 
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‘objected to the notion of mental representation, mental operation, the processing (as 
opposed to the ‘direct pick-up’) of information’ and other commonplace notions in 
cognitive science.  Gibson held that the external environment ‘provides an active 
organism with a continuous and stable flow of information to which it can respond’ – the 
so-called ‘invariance of perception’ (Gardner 1985).  In short, contrary to mainstream 
cognitive science, Gibson argued that a cognitive agent was directly immersed in a world 
that contained relevant information in raw form; an organism navigating through its 
environment needs no higher-level mental computation, inferences, operations, or 
representations.  Needless to say, Gibson did not believe that perception was a conceptual 
activity. 
 Perhaps already one is beginning to see a vague similarity between the 
perspectives of Heidegger and Gibson?  Two important similarities that are already 
apparent are: (1) both reject mental representations, and (2) both reject the notion that 
perception is a ‘high-level’ mental activity, in which, say, our conceptual framework or 
apparatus plays a role. 
 However, there are more profound, and less strained similarities.  Perhaps the 
most profound is a deep mistrust of dualism?  E. Reed (1988, p.48) remarks, ‘Gibson’s 
entire career was a surprisingly self-conscious attempt to overcome’ dualism, whether a 
dualism between subject and object, or private versus public reality.  Of course, many 
have criticized dualism; what is striking about the cases of Heidegger and Gibson is that 
the specific nature of their attacks on dualism, and the specific picture they both attempt 
to replace dualism with, are of a profoundly similar character. 
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 Central to Gibson’s attempt to overcome the dualism prevalent in mid-20th 
century perceptual psychology was his notion of – and emphasis on – activity.  
Traditional perceptual psychology accepted ‘the traditional distinction between 
meaningless stimuli and meaningful perceptions and representations’ (Reed 1988, p.184), 
i.e. perceptual psychology adhered to the following theoretical picture: a subject 
passively receives meaningless sensations and then confers meaning on an otherwise 
chaotic world by constructing meaningful representations out of these sensations.  
Gibson, realizing that this traditional picture inevitably leads to subjectivism (Reed 1988, 
p.184) insofar as the subject-object dichotomy is already embedded in it, replaced it with 
the notion that perception is an activity.  Specifically, Gibson called perception an 
‘exploratory activity:’ 
Perception is active, not passive.  It is exploratory, not merely receptive. 
(Gibson, 1958, p.43) 
 
By emphasizing the fact that our perception of the world is an activity on our part, rather 
than a passive receptivity to sensation, Gibson believed he was overcoming the dualism 
hopelessly enshrined in the traditional view.  Information is embedded in the 
environment, and the perceiver is an active participant in perceptual experience insofar as 
the perceiver actively seeks out this information; gone is the passive perceiver, or the 
detached Cartesian perceiver of the world.  In short, 
Gibson ‘came to consider perception an activity of motivated individuals, 
not the result of physical causes impinging on bodies in which minds are 
trapped.’  (Reed 1988, p. 195) 
 
So, above we saw that Heidegger and Gibson both rejected mental representation and a 
conceptualized perception.  Now, we see that not only did both reject dualism, but both 
did so utilizing a similar strategy: both emphasized the notion of activity.  Heidegger 
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emphasized the fact that in practical activity, the detached Cartesian subject doesn’t exist, 
while Gibson also rejected dualism by emphasizing activity; this time, the detached 
Cartesian subject was rejected for an entity actively engaged in the search for 
information.  Both entities, Dasein and Gibson’s perceiver, are motivated (through 
comportment or through the search for information), yet neither is a mentalistic entity. 
 Now, the precise pieces of information that we pick up in the activity of 
perception are termed ‘affordances’ by Gibson (1979).  Things have ‘affordances’ insofar 
as they can be unreflectively utilized for various purposes:   
Affordances are potentialities for action inherent in object or scene, the 
activities that can take place when an organism of a certain sort encounters 
an entity of a certain sort. (Gardner 1985). 
 
If an object is knee high, fairly resistant to deformation, with a sufficiently 
large surface, then it affords sitting. (Reed 1988, p.293) 
 
Since these affordances are perceived and utilized unreflectively, Gibson’s notion of 
affordance ‘permitted a (simplistic) analysis of an organism’s effectiveness within its 
environment,’ one that did not need recourse to ‘beliefs, attitudes, or mental effort’ 
Gardner 1985), i.e. mentalistic entities. 
 Vitally, the notion of affordance also played a key role in Gibson’s attempt to 
overcome dualism.  Gibson (1979, p. 129) states: 
An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective, and 
helps us to understand its inadequacies.  It is equally a fact of the 
environment and a fact of behavior.  It is both physical and psychological, 
yet neither.             
 
One can’t locate an affordance outside or inside, in the world or in the mind, as it 
undercuts these divisions insofar as it depends upon a symbiosis of subject and object.  
We can eat an apple, and an apple affords eating. 
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 So, here we see further parallels between Gibson and Heidegger.  Gibson’s notion 
of affordances has affinities with Heidegger’s notion of equipment: both entities only 
reveal themselves to Dasein or Gibson’s perceiver insofar as they can be unreflectively 
utilized to complete a task, and both notions undercut the subject-object dichotomy.   
 It is interesting that two profound thinkers, operating in very different contexts, 
independently formulated two views that reject dualism in a similar manner.  However, 
there are differences between the two thinkers, some of which I now discuss. 
2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEIDEGGER AND GIBSON 
Perhaps the most important difference between Gibson and Heidegger is their 
relationship to science.  Heidegger deems science a derivative means of studying beings, 
while he was concerned with the more originary question of being.  Heidegger (1962) 
writes: 
The question of being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions 
not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine beings as beings 
of such and such a type, and, in doing so, already operate with an 
understanding of being…’ 
 
In other words, the question of being that Heidegger is interested in is prior to the beings 
with which science deals with, as science has already implicitly assumed a stance on the 
question of being even as it sets out to study beings.  Gibson, of course, was a scientist, 
and while he traveled far, he didn’t travel to such lengths to evade dualism. 
 Another key difference is the circumstance that Heidegger made room for the 
Cartesian subject (i.e. when malfunction or breakdown occurs).  There is no attempt in 
Gibson to make room for the detached perceiver of perceptual psychology who may in 
fact utilize mental representations, because such a perceiver simply didn’t exist for 
Gibson.  In short, Heidegger, insofar as he can also explain and account for the very 
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phenomenon he is trying to surpass, seems to offer an account with more explanatory 
power. 
 Further, Heidegger’s notion of equipment is far more complex than Gibson’s 
notion of affordances.  For Heidegger, equipment is always embedded in an equipmental 
nexus, where items of equipment stand in various relations to one another (such as the 
relationship between pen and paper).  Gibson’s notion of affordance seems more 
simplistic, and is generally formulated in terms of a single object with a given affordance.  
There is also the question of animals and whether or not they utilize equipment.  Gibson’s 
affordances were not specific to human beings, i.e. snails could utilize a leaf with a given 
affordance, yet, can a snail utilize a piece of equipment?  In short, while there are 
undeniable affinities between the two thinkers, it must be remembered that there are 
important differences as well (it would be an interesting project to see if one account 
could be used to clarify and extend the other, etc, but such an effort is beyond the scope 
of this thesis).   
2.3 CRITICISMS OF GIBSON FROM THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
ESTABLISHMENT 
 
Gibson’s radical account of perception was, not surprisingly, vigorously criticized by the 
Cognitive Science establishment.  Here, I briefly recount two such criticisms: (1) 
Ullman’s (1980) and (2) Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1981). 
 Ullman (1980) argues – contra Gibson – that since ‘computational and 
psychological studies have amply shown that the perception of objects can be broken 
down into simpler units and into more elementary operations,’ rather than positing a 
completely direct perception, it is more reasonable and accurate to ‘posit a continuum of 
perceptual mechanisms ranging from direct to indirect’ (Gardner 1985).  While some 
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aspects of perception, such as those in which we detect the texture of objects, do seem to 
be direct, other aspects, such as the perception of motion, seem to be more indirect, a 
result of complex mental operations.  Object recognition, for example, seems to involve 
numerous operations, even to the point that prior knowledge and beliefs are involved 
(Ullman 1980; Gardner 1985).  
 Fodor and Pylsyhyn (1981) criticize Gibson’s notion of affordances, and in doing 
so, criticize his entire project.  Gardner (1985) summarizes their criticism in the 
following manner: 
The concept of affordance allows Gibson to explain how organisms know 
what to do with or how to respond to what they perceive, [however] Fodor 
and Pylyshyn argue that the properties of affordances are unconstrained – 
that anything can be an affordance. 
 
Since affordances are unconstrained, and since anything can be an affordance, then the 
very notion of an affordance is empty (i.e. the notion is a useless theoretical entity).  
Fodor states: 
The category of affordance seems to me to be a pure cheat; an attempt to 
have all the good out of intentionality without paying any of the price. 
 
In short, Fodor and Pylyshyn hold that on Gibson’s scheme, intentionality itself seems in 
peril. 
 The core of the problem with Gibson’s notion of affordance that Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1981) bring to the fore has already been alluded to: they are unconstrained.  
Without a ‘meaning interface’ between agent and world, without an agent wielding 
semantics, without some mechanism that can sort through the flood of affordances 
assaulting the senses, we would blindly react to stimuli at random.  We might sit on a hot 
stove if it is knee high.  Further, how would we know what to pay attention to in the first 
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place?  Without semantics, i.e. without knowing what the objects in the world are, then 
how do we know that one object is more important relative to another?  We may stare at 
the wallpaper while the room is on fire.  Essentially, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) argue 
that a meaning interface of some sort, i.e. a positing of a detached subject making 
inferences about the environment by manipulating mental representations, is the ‘price’ 
of intentionality.  It is very easy to reject mental representationalism, for example, but it 
is very hard to explain non-random, intelligent and purposive behavior once one has done 
so; Fodor and Pylyhsyn (1981) feel that Gibson failed.   
 It should be noted that adherents of Gibson’s direct perception theory have 
responded, in turn, to these criticisms.  Turvey and Shaw (1981), for instance, tried to 
defend Gibson from Fodor and Pylyshyn’s attack (for a discussion of a number of these 











       
 28
CHAPTER 3.  IS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE NECESSARILY 
CONCEPTUAL? 
 
At this point, we’ve met a number of thinkers (Husserl, Heidegger, Dreyfus, Gibson, 
Fodor and Pylyshyn, Ullman, etc.) who have taken stands on several important issues: 
dualism, mental representations, the need (or lack thereof) for meaning interfaces with 
the world, the Cartesian Theater, and the nature of perception in general.  While there are 
important differences between each of these thinkers, it can be said that they roughly fall 
into two broad groups as regards their stands on the issues mentioned above.  
 On one side, we have Heidegger, Gibson and Dreyfus. All three reject mental 
representations. All three challenge dualism (whether it be in philosophy, science, or 
artificial intelligence). Further, all three hold that one needn’t appeal to our concepts or 
conceptual abilities to explain how we cope with the everyday world. 
 On the other side, we have Husserl, Fodor, Pylyshyn and Ullman.  Ullman, Fodor, 
and Pylyshyn hold that – contra Gibson – mental processes and operations play a role in 
making our perceptual experience what it is.  Husserl would agree that our concepts play 
a role in perceptual experience.  
 Now, I examine a recent (and ongoing) philosophical debate concerning the 
relationship between our conceptual apparatus and our perceptual experience that can – 
once it is decided – decide many of these issues in favor of one side or the other.  I then 
briefly point out that one can find good arguments for both sides. 
3.1 THE DEBATE 
There are a number of ongoing debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind and 
philosophy of perception regarding the status of – and interaction between – perception, 
representation and conceptualization.  Open questions include: what constitutes a 
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representational system?  Is perceptual experience representational?  Is perceptual 
experience necessarily conceptual?  Can perceptual experience be representational but 
not conceptual?  In this chapter, I focus on one of these debates: is perceptual experience 
conceptual?  After introducing the debate, I argue that if it could be settled, many of the 
issues discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis could be settled.  
 C. Peacocke (1983, 86, 89) has been a staunch proponent of the view that 
perceptual experience is decidedly non-conceptual.  Peacocke argues that while 
perceptual experience is ‘representational,’ perceptual experience ‘is a form of 
representation that proceeds without concepts’ (Clark 1994).  Central to Peacocke’s 
argument is the realization that perceptual experience is generally ‘finer-grained’ than our 
concepts; ‘for example, no description can capture all of the particular details you might 
see in a wood table,’ i.e. ‘one lacks the concepts to describe the particular shapes and 
relations of grain line and burls’ (Clark 1994).  Since perceptual experience can outstrip 
our conceptual framework, since a perceptual experience can contain ineffable elements, 
then necessarily, perceptual experience represents the non-conceptual, i.e. perceptual 
experience is non-conceptual. 
 T. Crane (1992) also argues that perceptual experience is non-conceptual.  In ‘The 
Non-Conceptual Content of Experience,’ Crane – expanding on an idea of Frege’s ‘that a 
system of representation employs concepts if and only if it is composed of constituents 
that play a role in inferences’ (Clark 1994) – states ‘there is no such thing as inferences 
between perceptions.’  Since perceptual experience isn’t inferential, and since the ability 
to draw inferences is an essential aspect of the conceptual, perceptual experience is non-
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conceptual.  (On Crane’s (1992) account, perceptual experience can become 
conceptualized later, but it isn’t necessarily or inherently conceptual.) 
 Husserl – as we’ve already seen (part one) – offered an argument for the opposing 
side, i.e. for the claim that perceptual experience is necessarily conceptual, but he did so 
in an interesting manner.  Husserl argued that a full act of perception consisted of 
perception augmented by concepts.  Again, this was the only way Husserl could account 
for the leap (in intentionality) from a one-sided perspective of an object to the entire 
object.  
 Two recent thinkers who have argued that perceptual experience is conceptual are 
Carruthers (2001) and Putnam (1999).  Carruthers points out that we often find ourselves 
surrounded by familiar objects (‘cars’, ‘trees’, etc.); that is, we often find ourselves 
surrounded by a world that is conceptually defined.  Putnam (1999) states that ‘it seems’ 
to him that ‘many of our (perceptual) experiences do have the property of presupposing 
conceptual capacities on our part.’  Here, we see arguments that signitive representation 
is a part of – is in or explicitly guides – authentic appearance.  In short, concepts or our 
conceptual capacities are a component part of perception; concepts are an integral part of 
– and can’t be divorced from – perceptual experience.  (We will meet further arguments 
to the effect that perception is necessarily conceptual in chapters five and six.) 
3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEBATE  
The debate surrounding the conceptualization of perceptual data has tremendous bearing 
on the debates discussed in chapters one and two; in short, if the former debate could be 
settled, the latter debates could be settled.  
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 Recall the argument (chapter one) that in order for Dasein to be actively engaged 
with its environment, Dasein must at least open its eyes.  A normally sighted carpenter 
trying to go about her everyday activities with her eyes closed would not have much 
success.  She would constantly be losing things or tripping over things, that is – as her 
day would be one constant malfunction, she would be continually thrown into theoretical 
cognition, constantly finding herself having to reflect on her situation.  Now, if perceptual 
experience is necessarily conceptualized, that is, if, as soon as we open our eyes, our 
concepts or conceptual framework is present, and if in fact the carpenter must at least 
open her eyes during practical activity, then the carpenter would be operating with her 
concepts even at the level of practical activity.  If perceptual experience is necessarily 
conceptualized, then our interaction with the world, even while engaged in practical 
activity, would be such that our concepts were present.  Or, as soon as we open our eyes, 
Husserlian intentionality would be present, i.e. the carpenter would not interact with a 
mere item of equipment, with an ‘in-order-to-drive-the-nail,’ but rather with a full 
fledged concept, with a ‘hammer.’  (I’m in effect claiming that Heidegger’s (1962) notion 
of ‘umsich’ is impossible.)  As Fodor and Pylyshyn hold, perceptual data would be 
inevitably semantic.  There would simply be no room for Heidegger’s notion of 
equipment, and, Gibson’s direct pickup of knowledge would be a conceptual act.  This is 
all to say that if perceptual data is necessarily conceptualized, then it seems this can count 
as evidence for Husserl (and Fodor and Pylyshyn) and evidence against Heidegger (and 
Dreyfus and Gibson), at least as regards the issues at hand.  
 Now, assume that perceptual experience is inherently non-conceptual.  Objects 
wouldn’t appear to us as theoretical (Husserlian) concepts, i.e. a hammer wouldn’t 
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necessarily appear to us as a ‘hammer’ (as perception can proceed without concepts); 
rather, perceptual experience, at least while engaged in practical activity, would be a 
more basic, more Heideggerian affair.  Perception would be a simple, non-conceptual 
openness to the world, and Fodor and Pylyshyn’s critique of Gibson would lose its bite 
(as perception would not be inevitably semantic).  
 Finally, before I leave this debate for the time being, I reiterate that it is still open. 
3.3  SOME ARGUMENTS FOR BOTH SIDES 
In an effort to develop the problematic of this thesis in a little more detail, but primarily 
in order to motivate the reconciliation of the two perspectives offered in the following 
chapter, I briefly point out that good arguments can be found for both sides.  That is, 
since both sides make solid claims, perhaps the accurate perspective lies in a synthesis of 
the two views, one that can keep what is desirable in both views but can also evade the 
criticisms each view directs at the other?  
We’ve already seen (chapter two) that Ullman (1980) establishes the fact that 
perception can’t be absolutely direct in the sense that Gibson argued for; mental 
processes and operations are needed for our perceptual experience to be what it is.  For 
example, when one’s visual systems are damaged, one’s visual experience of the world is 
altered.  This is a brute, scientifically established fact, one that would be hard to argue 
against.  We’ve also seen the strong argument from Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) that 
without positing a meaning interface between agent and world, it is extremely difficult to 
account for intelligent (i.e. purposive, non-random) interaction with the world.  We need 
a meaning interface because without it – we would suffer from the Frame Problem; like 
Dennett’s (1984) robot, we would not be inclined to focus on the fact that there is a bomb 
 33
in the room.  We need to think ‘bomb’ before we know that the bomb is something to be 
avoided. 
 The other perspective has much in its favor as well. Gibson – like Ullman – was a 
scientist, an ‘extremely shrewd researcher’ (Gardner 1985), and he was able to account 
for certain aspects of perception in a convincing manner.  Heidegger’s account of the 
relationship between practical activity and theoretical cognition seems to have a strong 
intuitive and phenomenological appeal; it seems that we do become lost in the world 
while engaged in a practical activity at which we are adept.  Dreyfus’ critique of mental 
representations has similar appeal; often, we don’t utilize mental representations (at least 
consciously) while coping with the world. 
 The Heidegger/Dreyfus/Gibson camp is further strengthened through an appeal to 
H. Simon’s notion of ‘explanation by simulation.’  ‘Explanation by simulation’ is ‘a 
mode of psychological theorizing that has greatly facilitated, and will continue to 
facilitate, the accumulation of knowledge and theory in psychology’ (Simon 1991).  
Widely accepted, the central idea behind ‘explanation by simulation’ is that one can 
‘construct computer programs that can be given complex cognitive tasks, identical to 
those given to human subjects, and that will predict the temporal path of human behavior 
on those tasks (Newell and Simon 1972)’ (Simon 1991).  Cognitive psychologists 
construct models – such as Newell’s SOAR or Rummelhart and McClelland’s (1986) 
PDP model – that can also be used to explain and predict how humans perform cognitive 
tasks (Simon 1991).   
‘Such models enable psychology to organize large bodies of data around 
the mechanisms that produced them; and the availability and relevance of 
these large bodies of data provide powerful means to test the adequacy of 
the models’ (Simon 1991).   
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In short, ‘theories can be stated’ and tested ‘as computer programs’ (Simon 1991); if a 
given machine can capture, mimic or recreate the performance of human subjects in 
performing a given cognitive task, then this can count as evidence for the adequacy of the 
cognitive theory the machine is based on.      
 Given the fact that Symbolic Artificial Intelligence became more or less stagnant 
in the 1980s, so much so that many fled to alternative models such as connectionism, 
then, with the notion of explanation by simulation in mind, we can conclude that several 
aspects of the GOFAI research program were flawed, i.e. it seems that GOFAI’s failure 
supports Dreyfus’ claims.   
 We’ve also seen some philosophical arguments for and against a conceptualized 
perceptual experience.  The fact that good arguments can be found for both sides suggests 
that perhaps a synthesis is in order?  In the following chapter, I attempt to formulate one 
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 CHAPTER 4. CONCEPTUALIZED DIRECT PERCEPTION 
I began by delineating two profound yet widely divergent accounts of cognition, 
consciousness, and perception: Husserl’s and Heidegger’s.  Husserl put forth a more 
theoretical or highbrow account of cognition, one that emphasized the importance of – 
and independence of – consciousness; further, our conceptual framework played a key 
role in perception and intentionality.  Heidegger held that there was a more originary, 
more basic interaction with the world: we are directly immersed in a world where objects 
reveal themselves to us not as concepts but as items of equipment, defined only in so far 
as they can be put to practical use by Dasein.  Here, there is no detached Cartesian 
subject, no dualism, and no ‘mentalistic’ Husserlian consciousness.  I argued that the 
antagonism between the two thinkers finds an analogue in recent debates centering on the 
nature of vision and on Gibson’s theory of direct perception in particular.  I also argued 
that a contemporary debate in the philosophy of perception may be capable of settling 
several of these issues: if perceptual experience is necessarily conceptual, then it appears 
Husserl may have been right on several issues, if not, then Heidegger’s view seems the 
more accurate.  Finally, I held that good arguments can be found for both sides, a claim 
that provides motivation for this chapter, in which I formulate a synthesis between the 
two views. Specifically, I argue for a conceptualized direct perception, i.e. our interaction 
with the world is a more basic, more Heideggerian one, than many suppose, but this 
interaction is one guided by our conceptual apparatus.  As I show, this view is capable of 
keeping much of what is attractive from both views, while also meeting the criticisms 
each view directs at the other.  
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4.1 A CONCEPTUALIZED DIRECT PERCEPTION: THE BROAD PROBLEMATIC 
Here, before formulating my view in earnest, I pause to clearly and succinctly state the 
problematic that my view seeks to escape from.  We’ve been introduced to a certain 
tension, a dynamic, that exists in philosophy, cognitive science, and A.I.: the tension 
between those who hold that our interaction with the world is direct and unmediated by 
the mind (or our higher-level faculties) and those who hold that the mind plays a key role 
in our interaction with the world (by constructing perceptual experience for us, by 
imbuing perceptual experience with concepts, etc).   
 The view that I formulate below is driven by two principle beliefs about this 
dynamic.  First, many of the concepts dear to those who feel the mind constructs 
experience are dead or dying, a situation I discuss at length in regards to sense data, 
mental representations, and the Cartesian Theater.  It is this concern that inspires the 
‘direct’ in ‘conceptualized direct perception.’ 
 Second, as alluded to above, it is immensely difficult to account for purposive, 
intelligent behavior in the absence of the mind’s influence.  In other words, while concern 
one seems to push us forcibly to a direct view, there are strong reasons for wanting to 
retreat to an indirect view insofar as it permits our concepts to play a role in perception.  
It is this concern that inspires the ‘conceptual’ in ‘conceptualized direct perception.’   
4.2 THREE BAD IDEAS 
In this subsection, I discuss three ideas: (1) sense data, (2) mental representation, and (3) 
the Cartesian Theater.  These ideas have a number of things in common, including: (1) 
they can all be seen as belonging firmly in the camp of those who hold that perceptual 
experience (and our interaction with the world) is necessarily constructed by (or mediated 
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by) the mind, (2) all three have been vigorously criticized in the last 50 years, and (3) a 
conceptualized direct perception would eschew all three.  Further, as will become 
apparent, all three ideas are interlocked, as one of the ideas frequently needs (or assumes) 
another.  In short, all three may very well rise and fall together. 
4.2.1 SENSE DATA 
Sense data theorists claimed the following: 
We never see or otherwise perceive (or ‘sense’), or anyhow we never 
directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only 
sense data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, 
percepts, &c).  (Austin, 1964, p.2)   
 
Sense data views occupy a prominent place in the philosophical tradition; for example, 
the problems surrounding sense data ‘were recognized by the Greek skeptics and were 
perhaps the most significant common focus of the British empiricists Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume’ (deVries and Triplett 2000, p.2) (of course, the most prominent problem with 
sense data views is that, if we are one step removed from reality, then how do we know 
reality is there in the first place?).  Perhaps one can say that sense data views picked up 
even more steam with Kant; if our minds in fact construct our visual experience, then it 
seems raw materials are needed for this construction, i.e. sense data.  Further, ‘sense-
datum theories were probably the most prominent and influential theories of perception in 
the Anglo-American philosophical world during the first half of the 20th century;’ this can 
be seen in the writings of B. Russell (1926) and G.E. Moore (1953; 65) (deVries and 
Triplett 2000, p.1).  We’ve also seen (chapter one) that Husserl posited the existence of 
sense data in his theory of perception.   
However, a number of devastating criticisms of sense-datum views began to 
emerge, starting with Heidegger and then continuing, in Anglo-American philosophy in 
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the 1940s and 50s, with Wittgenstein (1958), Ryle (1949), Sellars (1956) and Austin 
(1962) (deVries and Triplett 2000).  As a result of this onslaught, current ‘conventional 
wisdom among philosophers at the present time is that the credibility of sense-datum 
theories has been destroyed beyond hope of redemption’ (deVries and Triplett 2000). 
Of course, there were several seemingly good arguments for the existence of 
sense data.  I now briefly rehearse four of these arguments: (1) Russell’s argument, (2) 
the argument from illusion, (3) the argument from physics, and (4) the argument from 
different minds.  In 5.2.1.3, after I have begun to sketch my view, we’ll see that none of 
these arguments hold up.   
Russell’s argument is the following: presumably, while actual objects are ‘stable’ 
in that they don’t constantly change their properties when an observer changes her 
perspective, the object, as it appears to an observer, constantly changes.  The way a table 
appears to us changes as we walk around the table, but it doesn’t seem the actual table is 
changing with the change in appearance.  So, the way the table appears to us can’t be the 
way the table actually is, i.e. the appearance of the table and the table itself are two 
different things.  It follows that in perception, we interact with sense data and not with 
actual objects. 
The argument from illusion claims that sometimes (dreams, hallucinations, 
illusions) our perception deceives us, i.e. the way things appear to us is not the way 
things actually are.  But, these illusory perceptual experiences are qualitatively 
indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences.  So, even when perception is 
veridical, we can’t be seeing actual objects but only appearances, i.e. appearances 
constructed from sense data. 
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The argument from physics holds that the world physics describes is very 
different from the world we experience, so we can’t experience the world physics 
describes, i.e. we interact with mere appearances. 
The argument from different minds holds that animals perceive the world in a 
radically different fashion than we do (a bee, for instance, sees multiple yet identical 
images, while a bat perceives through sonar).  So, who is to say which world (i.e. the 
world we experience or the world an animal experiences) is the right one?  It must be that 
we all see appearances.     
4.2.1.1 AN UNRESOLVED TENSION 
Sense data views are more or less extinct, so the reader may be wondering why I’m 
discussing them at all?  I discuss them to point out a very perplexing tension that exists in 
the wake of the rejection of sense data views, a tension I now describe. 
 Many in philosophy and cognitive science still adhere to the broadly Kantian 
notion that the mind shapes our perceptual experience.  If not for the specific workings of 
the mind, our perceptual experience would be different, or perhaps not even possible.  
Recall Ullman’s (1980) criticism of Gibson: cognitive science has firmly established that 
mental processes and operations shape our perceptual experience.  Ullman’s view is 
representative of the broadly Kantian bent of cognitive science orthodoxy. 
 But, while many still operate within the broadly Kantian framework, few believe 
in sense data.  This is perplexing for the following reason: sense data were always 
supposed to be the raw materials that the mind constructed perceptual experience with.  
So, the mind constructs perceptual experience, yet we no longer have access to the 
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supposed raw materials of this construction.  This is akin to trying to build a log cabin 
without any logs, and is perplexing to say the least.  
4.2.1.2 HOW PERCEPTION CAN BE DIRECT AND SHAPED BY THE MIND 
The tension I point to can be easily unraveled, however.   
One can simply acknowledge the fact that mental processes and operations are 
present, and do shape the specific character of our perception, while adding the additional 
proviso that these processes are merely shaping the way that we see the world directly 
(direct in the sense that perceptual experience is not a mental construction).   That is, one 
can acknowledge the fact that mental operations lead to – and are needed for – our 
normal perceptual experience without having to retreat back to sense data, as one can 
simply hold that mental processes are an aspect of – or are a part of the process of – our 
direct interaction with the world; mental processes are simply the means through which 
we see directly.  Vitally, there is no need to posit an additional interface.  The fact that 
mental processes are implicated in how we see does not mean that we are interacting with 
a picture of, and not the, world; the fact that mental processes are determining the way 
the computer screen in front of me appears does not mean that I’m looking at a second 
computer screen, or a picture of a computer screen.  Think of looking at a stick 
underwater; the fact that the water is shaping the way the stick appears does not imply 
that you’re looking at a second stick, or a perceptual picture of a stick. 
When I say that mental processes merely shape the way we see directly, I’m 
sidestepping the tension outlined above.  I mean to imply that the fact that mental 
processes shape our visual experience does not necessarily imply that our visual 
experience is not direct, or is one step removed from reality, or is constructed from sense 
 41
data, as one can simply hold that mental processes shape the manner in which we see 
directly.  In short, one can allow for the fact that mental processes shape our vision 
without retreating back to sense data by simply holding that mental processes merely 
mediate a direct interaction with the world; mental operations shape the character of a 
direct interaction with the world (i.e. they shape the way the world appears to us), and do 
not lead to the construction of a second, ‘perceptual,’ reality.             
4.2.1.3 THE POSITIVE ARGUMENTS FOR SENSE DATA REFUTED 
I now show that my view, as it is formulated to this point, can disarm the positive 
arguments for sense data (5.2.1). 
 Russell’s argument doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.  Mental operations lead to our 
direct interaction with the world.  The mental operations that shape our perception are 
such that we don’t receive full knowledge of an object at a given time, i.e. we can only 
interact with a portion of an object.  But the fact that we can only interact with a portion 
of an object doesn’t entail that we are not directly interacting with that part of the object 
that we do interact with. 
 The argument from illusion also fails.  Mental operations shape the character of 
our direct interaction with world.  There is nothing to preclude these mental operations 
from malfunctioning (say, from the ingestion of a hallucinatory drug), in which case our 
direct interaction with the world will be altered and less effective, i.e. we will hallucinate.  
The fact that mental operations can malfunction doesn’t imply that we indirectly interact 
with the world, but only that our direct interaction with the world is not always perfect.        
 The argument from physics is also inadequate.  Mental processes shape a direct 
interaction with the world, and further, the character of these mental processes will 
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determine the way the world appears to us.  Our mental processes are such that we see 
macroscopic as opposed to microscopic objects; this doesn’t entail that we see 
macroscopic objects indirectly, but only that we don’t see microscopic objects.  Perhaps a 
Martian’s mental operations are such that she directly interacts with the atomic realm?  
 The argument from different minds collapses as well.  Mental operations shape 
the character of a direct interaction with the world.  Our mental operations and a bat’s 
mental operations are drastically different, so we would expect that the character of our 
direct interaction with the world and the character of a bat’s direct interaction with the 
world would drastically differ.  Further, this difference in mental operations leads to us 
being responsive to different aspects of the world than a bat (we don’t locate things 
through sonar, a dog doesn’t see color); the fact that we are responsive to different 
aspects of the world than animals doesn’t imply that we are indirectly interacting with 
that part of the world that we are responsive to.     
4.2.2 MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS AND PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR  
Now, I expand my view, and discuss what it implies about mental representations. 
Above, in rejecting sense data, I argued that mental operations merely shape the 
way we see the world directly, i.e. we see the world, not a facsimile of the world.    
 In this rejection of sense data, there is an implicit rejection of the notion that 
perceptual experience is a mental representation.  First, sense data, which are now gone, 
were supposed to be the raw materials from which perceptual mental representations 
were constructed; it follows that perceptual mental representations do not exist.  Second, 
holding that we interact with the world (obviously) implies that we do not interact with a 
perceptual mental representation.   
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 Now, it is important not to equivocate on ‘mental representation.’  At least two 
distinct types of mental representations can be posited: (1) we can hold that perceptual 
experience is representational, and (2) we can discuss purely conceptual representations 
of the world.  We can say that the perceptual object in front of me, a computer screen, is 
actually a representation of the real computer screen in the world; I have rejected this 
claim.  Or, we can say that while I’m looking at the actual computer screen in the world, 
there is a different type of representation at work in my experience, a conceptual 
representation (so while I’m looking at the actual computer in the world, I’m also 
representing the computer in a conceptual sense, i.e. I am also thinking ‘computer’).  I 
have not rejected the second claim.   
As we saw in chapter two, part of the motivation for positing meaning interfaces 
(or conceptual representations of the world) between agent and world is the immense 
difficulty one has in explaining how an agent effectively interacts with the world in the 
absence of such interfaces.  Recall Fodor and Pylyshyn’s (1981) argument that Gibson’s 
affordances would be unconstrained in the absence of a meaning interface.  We would 
put items to extremely bizarre use; we would sit on anything knee-high, for example.  
Further, there is the danger that without knowing what a given affordance is (in a 
semantic sense), we will not know whether or not we should pay attention to it in the first 
place: we would react to stimuli at random without any feel for the relative importance of 
the different stimuli.  We would stand in the crosswalk staring at a tree as a bus raced 
towards us.  In short, the very phenomena of selective attention and of intelligent, 
purposive action seem in peril in the absence of a conceptual interface with the world. 
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Further, recall the argument above that mental operations merely shape our direct 
interaction with the world: here, we have a direct interaction with the world (no sense 
data, no perceptual mental representations) that is shaped by mental processes as well.  
Now, just as one can grant the fact that our ability to perceive in the manner that we do 
depends upon certain mental processes and still hold a direct conception of agent/world 
interaction, one can hold that the agent/world interaction is direct yet conceptually 
‘mediated.’  That is, just as some mental processes may be implicated in how I perceive 
motion directly, other mental processes – processes that deal with our conceptual 
apparatus or framework – may also be implicated in determining how we directly 
perceive the world.  While one process may determine how we directly see motion, 
another process – one concerned with our conceptual apparatus – may determine or shape 
our perceptual experience insofar as it helps determine what we pay attention to, and how 
we react to what we see.   
In short, when the situation is conceived of in this manner, one can do away with 
sense data and perceptual mental representations, while still meeting concerns over (1) 
the fact that mental processes shape how we see and (2) the fact that it seems we need a 
meaning interface for purposive, non-random interaction with our environment.  In short, 
mental processes, some of which deal with our concepts, determine how we see things 
directly.   
4.2.3 THE CARTESIAN THEATER 
Now that I’ve discussed sense data and mental representations, I turn to a third idea: the 
Cartesian Theater.  First, I discuss in more detail, exactly what the Cartesian Theater 
view is, before briefly discussing D. Dennett’s (1991) critique of – and alternative to – 
 45
the Cartesian Theater.  Then, I argue that sense data, mental representations, and the 
Cartesian Theater are interrelated in such a manner that if one falls, the others fall.  This 
claim is significant, as while sense data views are extinct, the other two ideas, despite 
facing harsh criticisms as of late, are not.   Finally, I discuss the relationship between 
Dreyfus’ critique of the Cartesian Theater and Dennett’s.   
4.2.3.1 DENNETT’S CRITIQUE OF THE CARTEISAN THEATER 
Throughout, I’ve alluded several times to the notion of a ‘Cartesian Theater,’ equating 
the Cartesian Theater to a central subject or ‘I think’ that guides action.  I now improve 
upon this definition, and briefly explain Dennett’s alternative picture.   
 Essentially, ‘the Cartesian Theater is a metaphorical picture of how conscious 
experience must sit in the brain’ (Dennett 1991, p. 107).  This picture posits a single, 
central point where consciousness occurs, a ‘center…where ‘it all comes together’’ 
(Dennett 1991, p. 39).  The Cartesian Theater would be the ‘Oval Office,’ or the central 
‘Headquarters’ of the brain, the ‘boundary’ or ‘finish line’ where otherwise unconscious 
information enters conscious awareness.  This ‘inner sanctum’ would act as a sort of 
CPU, a focal point that guides the action of all the other parts of the body by sending out 
orders.  In short, the Cartesian Theater is where information or input from the world 
comes so as to be examined by a central ‘I think,’ who then sends out orders or output to 
the rest of the body based on the information.   
 Descartes, the first ‘Cartesian Theater’ theorist (hence the name of the view), 
infamously held that the pineal gland was most likely the location of the Cartesian 
Theater.  While we chuckle today at Descartes’ suggestion, other areas of the brain have 
more recently been pegged as the location of the Theater: including ‘the anterior 
 46
cingulate, the reticular formation, [and] various places in the frontal lobes’ (Dennett 
1991, p. 107). 
 To demonstrate that he is not attacking a straw man, or beating a dead horse, 
when attacking the Cartesian Theater, Dennett (1991) points to numerous cognitive 
scientists and neuroscientists who face problems because of an adherence to – or 
assumption of – the ‘Cartesian Theater’ picture of the mind.  For example, Dennett cites 
the much discussed work of Libet (on the problem of backwards referral in time), and 
Levelt’s (1989) work on speech production.   
 Dennett’s alternative to the Cartesian Theater is his ‘Multiple Drafts’ model of 
consciousness.  In Dennett’s model, the notion that there is a central place where all 
information is presented in a single narrative to a central ‘I think’ is abandoned (Dennett 
1991, p. 113).  Rather, the content of consciousness is distributed throughout the brain, 
and doesn’t need to all be brought together in a single point.  There is no such thing as a 
single narrative that is consciousness; instead, the contents of consciousness undergo 
continual revision or editing (or move through ‘multiple drafts’).        
4.2.3.2 ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENSE DATA, PERCEPTUAL 
MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS, AND THE CARTESIAN THEATER 
 
Now, I remark on the relationship between the three central ideas discussed in this 
chapter. 
 The relationship between the three ideas can be clearly illustrated by taking the 
metaphor of a Cartesian Theater literally: think of (perceptual) mental representations as 
the movies shown on the Cartesian Theater movie screen, think of sense data as the raw 
materials with which the images on the movie screen (i.e. representations) are constructed 
(say, the beams of light coming from the projector), while the Cartesian Theater is the 
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entire room, including the movie screen and the spectator (or central ‘I Think’) watching 
the film.   
 I, along with everyone else, have rejected the notion of sense data, which amounts 
to a rejection of perceptual mental representations.  Now, we see that the rejection of 
sense data and perceptual mental representations amounts to a rejection of the Cartesian 
Theater (as a possible model that can explain our perceptual experience): there is no 
longer any movie been shown, so there is no longer any need for the Cartesian Theater 
itself.  In short, sense data, perceptual mental representations, and the Cartesian Theater 
rise and fall together; since the idea of sense data has been widely rejected, the other two 
ideas (at least in the context of a discussion of perception) should be rejected as well. 
 To clarify: the notion that there is a central headquarters in the brain implies that 
there is a single, unified representation of the world.  If the agent in the headquarters is to 
send out orders to all parts of the body, and if this central headquarters is the only place 
that sends out such orders, then the central headquarters needs to be appraised of the 
overall circumstances in which the body is placed; the headquarters must know what the 
arms need to do, what the legs need to do and so on.  But, for the central headquarters to 
know all of this, it must be that a single, unified representation of the world is offered for 
the headquarter’s perusal.  In short, the notion of a central ‘I think’ seems to entail the 
notion of a single representation.  But this representation, as a result of the rejection of 
sense data, can’t possibly be a perceptual representation, as perception is not 
representational.  Therefore, as regards perception, the central ‘I think’ is no longer 
possible. 
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 It may be that there is a central conceptual representation of the world that can 
keep the central ‘I Think’ informed of the overall circumstances of a situation, but this 
central representation can’t be a perceptual representation (as they do not exist).  So, as 
regards perception at least, the Cartesian Theater seems a poor model of cognition.      
4.2.3.3 DREYFUS AND DENNETT 
I briefly pause to point out an interesting consequence of the rejection of the Cartesian 
Theater. 
 In chapter one, I discussed Dreyfus’ contention that action can be purposive 
without a central agent having a goal in mind.  If the rejection of the Cartesian Theater is 
correct, then Dreyfus’ contention is correct as well.  Obviously, if there is no central 
headquarters or central agent in the first place, then there can be no way that the non-
existent agent has a goal in mind (as a non-existent agent can’t have anything in mind).  
Or, one can’t hold that a prerequisite of goal-oriented activity is the presence of a central 
agent who has the goal in mind if there is no central agent.   
 The notion of a central agent who guides activity is a hallmark of GOFAI; this, 
taken with the consideration above, suggests that Dennett’s work undermines GOFAI 
(perhaps surprisingly).    
4.3 SUMMARY 
 
To briefly summarize the claims of this chapter: I pointed out a tension that exists in the 
widespread rejection of sense data.  Many still adhere to the broadly Kantian view that 
the mind constructs perceptual experience, but without sense data, this view seems 
puzzling (given that sense data were supposed to be the raw materials of this 
construction).  I then resolved this tension by pointing out that perhaps the mind merely 
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shapes how we see the world directly.  Now, one can respect the intuition that mental 
operations are needed for our normal perceptual experience while also adhering to the 
rejection of sense data.  Further, not only are mental processes implicated in how we see 
the world directly, but some these processes are involved with our conceptual apparatus; 
now, one can not only reject sense data and hold that mental processes shape perception, 
one can also account for the presence of concepts (and hence for our intelligent 
interaction with the world) from within a direct view.  In short, the claim that our 
concepts guide perception is consistent with a direct perception view, when 
circumstances are conceived in the manner I have described.   
 I also argued that the rejection of sense data entails a rejection of mental 
representations, which in turn entails a rejection of the Cartesian Theater as a model for 
perceptual experience.  Sense data were the materials out of which perceptual mental 
representations were constructed, and without perceptual representations of the world, a 
Cartesian Theater is not a possible model for perception.  If there is a Cartesian Theater, 
it must operate with conceptual representations of the world, but the fact that the 
Cartesian Theater can’t account for perception suggests that it is a poor model of 
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CHAPTER 5. IS THE WORLD ITSELF CONCEPTUAL? 
 
In this chapter, I expand, clarify, and justify the claims of the previous chapter.  In section 
5.1, I criticize the arguments of those who hold, against the claims of the previous 
chapter, that perception is not conceptual.  This criticism leads to the formulation of a 
new claim: perhaps perception is inevitably conceptual because at least some aspects of 
our concepts are in the world, and hence perceived with the world, in a sense described 
below.  This claim can answer the (‘Dreyfusian’) question: why, if perception is 
conceptual, do we often not consciously reflect upon our concepts when engaged with the 
world?  This claim can also be seen as an expansion of the claims in the previous chapter, 
as it is an attempt to describe one way (though not the only way) in which perception 
may be conceptual.  In section 5.2, I discuss a philosophical ally of my view: J. 
McDowell (1994).  I point out that the claims of section 5.1 overlap with McDowell’s, so 
a conceptualized direct perception (where perception is conceptual in the sense described 
in 5.1 and 5.2) would also be able to avoid a perplexing philosophical difficulty that 
McDowell delineates.  In 5.3, I discuss a different type of perceptual experience not 
discussed thus far: those experiences where we have both perception and a conscious, 
conceptual reflection upon the perceptual experience.  In 5.4, I point to evidence from 
cognitive science to support my views.  In 5.5, I summarize the claims of chapters 4 and 
5, offering a synoptic view of my entire hybrid theory of perception.   
5.1 AGAINST PEACOCKE AND CRANE 
My view, a ‘conceptualized direct perception,’ is beginning to take shape.  Now, I pause 
to criticize the arguments to the effect that perception cannot be a conceptual affair 
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(chapter three).  This discussion also allows me to explain one specific way in which 
perception may be conceptual.      
Recall Peacocke’s argument (chapter three) against viewing perceptual experience 
as a conceptual affair: there are aspects of our perceptual experience that can’t be 
captured in language or with our concepts, therefore, perceptual experience is non-
conceptual.  I won’t dispute that there are non-conceptual aspects of our perceptual 
experience, but conceding this does not imply that perceptual experience is completely or 
absolutely devoid of conceptual content.  Concepts can still be implicated in our 
perceptual experience even though they can’t completely capture or subsume perceptual 
experience. 
Further, the fact that there are non-conceptual elements in perception seems 
arbitrary or accidental.  We may lack the concepts to describe the shapes of the wood 
grains on a table, but there doesn’t seem to be anything preventing us (in principle) from 
creating and using concepts to describe these shapes.  Perhaps Martians have an 
extremely developed vocabulary when it comes to shapes, in which case the shapes of the 
wood grains would not be beyond the reach of a Martian’s conceptual apparatus?  In 
short, Peacocke’s argument seems to turn on a circumstance that could be otherwise.   
 Likewise, Crane’s point that we don’t make inferences in perceptual experience 
(in the sense that we don’t infer one perceptual experience from another) doesn’t 
necessarily imply that perceptual experience is conceptually innocent.  Our conceptual 
apparatus may play a role in our perceptual experience even though it may not play a role 
in the movement from one perceptual experience to the next.  Perhaps our concepts help 
define what we pay attention to in a given perceptual experience, or perhaps we make 
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inferences in – or behind – our perceptual experiences?  In other words, maybe I infer 
that there is a ‘car’ in front of me, even though this inference doesn’t play a role in 
ensuring the car’s continued presence in my next visual experience.  Or perhaps I simply 
see a ‘car’ non-inferentially, i.e. I simply see a ‘car’ (a car under its conceptual aspect) 
without inferring that the object is a ‘car.’   
 Peacocke argues for the non-conceptualized nature of perceptual experience by 
appealing to the fine-grained nature of perceptual experience.  However, this argument 
can be turned on its head, i.e. one can argue from the fine-grained nature of perceptual 
experience to the opposite conclusion: perceptual experience is necessarily conceptual.  
The fact that perception outstrips our concepts only implies that perception contains not 
only our concepts but additional information as well, and not that perception doesn’t 
contain concepts at all.  While my concepts may not be able to completely capture or 
describe perceptual experience, it seems impossible to deny that aspects of my concepts 
are included in perceptual experience.  When I look at a tree, I see aspects of my tree 
concept: I see leaves, bark, green, limbs, etc.  Granted, I don’t see every aspect of my tree 
concept, I don’t see photosynthesis, or carbon dioxide turning to oxygen, but it seems 
undeniable that when I look at a tree, I see some – or even many – aspects of my tree 
concept.  In short, in a sense, when I look at a tree, I’m looking at aspects of my ‘tree’ 
concept as aspects of my ‘tree’ concept (leaves etc) are embedded in the visual 
experience of a tree.   
 H. Dreyfus (chapter one) – while arguing against mental representations (in either 
a perceptual or conceptual sense) – certainly makes some points that seem intuitively 
correct.  Often, when coping with our environment, we don’t need recourse to conceptual 
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mental representations.  For example, when I walk around my apartment, I do so without 
the aid of a little mental picture of my apartment’s floor plan, and I don’t need to think 
‘door’ to walk through one.  But one can plausibly argue that the reason we don’t need 
conscious recourse to our conceptual apparatus or to conceptual mental representations 
while coping with our environment is because aspects of our concepts are embedded in – 
and so are directly perceived in – our perceptual experience of the environment (in the 
sense of the tree example above).  In perceptual experience, a concept doesn’t have to be 
explicitly called to mind because it already is called to mind insofar as it is embedded to a 
degree in a direct perception of our environment (to the degree that aspects of the concept 
are embedded in the environment).  That is, we directly interact with our concepts 
because they are embedded in the world.  Perhaps the visual experience of an object can 
‘stand-in’ for the concept, so to speak?  So, I don’t have to explicitly think ‘tree’ because 
I’m looking at one; I don’t have to manipulate a mental picture of my apartment to move 
through it, as I’m in it.  Here, (1) we would have a perceptual experience that is 
necessarily conceptualized because our perceptual experience necessarily contains our 
concepts, and (2) perceptual experience is conceptualized in such a manner that we don’t 
need conscious access to our concepts. 
 To clarify, when I say that looking at a tree can be ‘just as good’ as thinking 
‘tree,’ I mean to imply that the visual experience of a tree and the concept ‘tree’ are 
interchangeable in a sense.  For example, it may be that visual appearances of objects can 
play a role in inferences.  So, just as I can infer the proposition ‘there is bark’ from the 
proposition ‘there is a tree present,’ I may be able to infer the proposition ‘there is bark’ 
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from the visual appearance of a tree, i.e. visual objects may play a role in inferences (as 
they are interchangeable with our concepts in a sense).      
 The view espoused here can be summarized in the following manner: we are in 
direct interaction with a world that is conceptually defined insofar as our mental 
processes (some of which deal with our conceptual framework) shape the way we 
directly perceive the world.  Further, I don’t need to consciously reflect on these 
concepts, or have them explicitly in mind, insofar as they are present visually, i.e. I don’t 
need to think ‘tree’ because I’m looking at one.  This circumstance can explain why we 
don’t consciously utilize our conceptual capacities while coping with the world, and may 
also account for the so-called ‘semantic transparency’ of phenomenal experience?  
Further, there are very profound philosophical reasons for believing this view accurate, as 
we’ll now see. 
5.2 JOHN MCDOWELL’S MIND AND WORLD 
 
J. McDowell’s (1994) Mind and World is a complicated work, heavily influenced by 
difficult thinkers such as Kant (or more precisely, P. F. Stawson’s (1966) Kant), D. 
Davidson (1984, 86), and Sellars (1956), so the short treatment it will receive here can’t 
possibly do justice to the work as a whole.  However, McDowell’s (1994) work is 
extremely relevant to the view formulated in chapter five, so a brief discussion of 
McDowell is warranted, if not demanded. 
 The easiest way to approach McDowell’s (1994) view is through Kant (1929).  In 
the first critique, Kant distinguished between (1) the intuition, where via our receptivity, 
we are able to intake bits of experience (structured by the mind through the a priori forms 
of time and space), and (2) the understanding, the realm of the conceptual.  For Kant, the 
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intuition and the understanding could not stand apart, i.e. ‘thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.’  An empirical judgment consists of (1) 
concepts (the understanding) and (2) an experiential intake (the intuition); if not for 
concepts, there would be no judgment, and if not for experience, there would be nothing 
to judge.   
 The understanding was said to be ‘spontaneous,’ a word which suggests that the 
realm of concepts is the realm of freedom, or is at least defined by freedom.  It isn’t 
exactly clear why the realm of concepts is thought to be the realm of freedom, but ‘a 
schematic…answer is that the topography of the conceptual sphere is constituted by 
rational relations’ (McDowell 1994).  The realm of concepts is the realm of justifications, 
of normativity, i.e. ‘is at least part of what Sellars calls “the space of reasons,”’ while we 
have no freedom as regards the bits of experiential intake filtered through the intuition 
(the world is what it is, so to speak).  There is nothing normative about the brute 
impingement of experience upon our senses.   
 But, once we recognize that the conceptual sphere is free to an extent, a possible 
problem arises: 
The more we play up the connection between reason and freedom, the 
more we risk losing our grip on how exercises of concepts constitute 
warranted judgments about the world.  (McDowell 1994, p. 5). 
 
Kant’s notion of the intuition could provide a check on the freedom of the understanding: 
the thought was that experience must impinge upon the conceptual realm from the 
outside, so as (1) to provide a check on the freedom of the understanding (I can’t make 
wild claims such as ‘pigs fly’ because the pigs that I see in the world don’t) and (2) to 
enable experience ‘to be a source of knowledge.’  Without this external check upon the 
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free understanding, the conceptual realm would ‘degenerate into moves in a self-
contained game;’ the conceptual realm would be severed from the world, which would 
make it impossible for the world to serve as a source of knowledge.   
 But, as a result of Sellars’ critique of the Myth of the Given, the traditional 
Kantian picture breaks down.  Sellars’ a rejection of the Given amounted to a rejection of 
the idea that bits of experience can serve as justification for propositions: a proposition 
can only justify and be justified by other propositions.  In other words, ‘when we reject 
the Myth of the Given, we reject the idea that tracing back the ground for a judgment can 
terminate in pointing to a bare presence’ (McDowell 1994, p. 39).  So, if one follows 
Sellars, then the old scheme becomes impossible: experience can’t serve as a check on 
the freedom of the conceptual (as the conceptual is severed from experience), and 
experience can’t serve as justification for empirical judgments (as only a further 
judgment can justify a judgment).  In Kantian terms, the intuition can no longer fulfill its 
designated role, in which case the danger discussed above is actualized, i.e. the 
conceptual sphere becomes a self-enclosed system that never encounters any ‘friction’ 
from experience.  In turn, it seems that the very notion of empirical knowledge is in peril, 
as what can justify an empirical proposition if not experience?  In short, taking Sellars’ 
critique of the Myth of the Given as a premise, we wind up with D. Davidson’s 
‘coherentism’ as a conclusion.  McDowell holds that this is unacceptable.   
 So, McDowell’s central concern is clear: as a result of the loss of the Given, it 
seems the conceptual is severed from experience, which seems to threaten the very notion 
of empirical knowledge.  McDowell’s solution to this dilemma is radical: McDowell 
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takes issue with the dualistic division between the conceptual and experience, holding 
that experience should be thought of as being conceptual.   
 McDowell reasons as follows: the old picture, which had experience impinging 
upon the conceptual realm from the outside (so as to serve as a justification for the 
conceptual (or empirical propositions)), is no longer open to us.  So, one possible solution 
is to hold that the experience that impinges upon us is already conceptual, or can exert a 
‘rational,’ as opposed to merely ‘causal,’ influence on our thought (p. 34).  In other 
words, the boundary between experience and the conceptual is broken down by holding 
that experience itself is conceptual, a move that would solve McDowell’s central 
problem: if experience is conceptual, then it can play a role in justifying empirical 
judgments and so on.   
 But, while we now have a solution to the difficulty McDowell points to, there is a 
further difficulty: how do we make sense of the solution?  That is, what precisely does 
the claim that experience is conceptual mean?  What does it mean to say that experience 
can exert a ‘rational’ influence on our thought? 
 These questions can be clarified via appeal to my example of a tree (from chapter 
five): looking at a tree can be just as good as thinking ‘tree.’  On the old view, the visual 
experience of a tree could serve as evidence for the proposition, ‘there is a tree nearby,’ 
where the proposition is understood as being a radically different type of entity than the 
visual experience.  But there is another option: one can deny that experience is radically 
different from the conceptual, i.e. experience is conceptual.  So, rather than saying that 
the visual experience of a tree can act as evidence for the proposition ‘there is a tree 
present,’ one can hold that the visual experience of a tree and the proposition ‘there is a 
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tree present’ are two sides of the same coin, i.e. are interchangeable.  Just as I can infer 
the proposition ‘there is bark’ from the proposition ‘there is a tree present,’ I can infer the 
proposition ‘there is bark’ from the visual appearance of a tree.  That is, the visual 
experience of a tree, just like a proposition, can play a rational role in thought (in the 
sense that it can play a role in the logical space of reasons).  When one claims that 
experience is conceptual or has conceptual content, the content is ‘things are thus-and-so’ 
(McDowell 1994), whatever ‘thus-and-so’ happens to be (i.e. whatever specific 
experience we are talking about). 
 So, we see that there are profound philosophical reasons for suspecting that 
experience is conceptual. 
5.3 PERCEPTION WITH BOTH A VISUAL OBJECT AND CONCEPTS 
Another circumstance that might (and frequently does) arise, another type of perceptual 
experience, is that we have a perceptual experience with conceptual content in the sense 
that we both (1) look at a tree and (2) consciously think ‘tree.’  The principle claim I 
make as regards this circumstance is the following: when we do have both consciously 
held concepts and perceptual experience, we directly perceive the concept in or with the 
object itself.  That is, when we see an object, cognition does not proceed in such a 
manner that we have to read a concept into the object; rather, we think the concept with 
the object. 
 While arguing for his version of direct realism, Putnam (1999), in connection with 
Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing as, duck/rabbit picture, problematic,’ makes an important point 
about mental images (and presumably perceptual objects as well).  When we form a 
mental image of a deer grazing on the meadow, the image isn’t such that an interpretation 
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has to be read into it; rather, we perceive the sense or meaning of the image in the image 
itself.  A particular shape and color and so on are seen as a ‘deer,’ the meaning is intrinsic 
to the image.  As Putnam points out, Wittgenstein (1958) argued for the same thesis, 
which again, presumably carries over to perceptual objects as well.  (See Mulhall (1990) 
for an interesting treatment of this issue, one that also centers on Heidegger’s work; in 
effect, Mulhall argues that we see things under a ‘continuous aspect perception,’ i.e. we 
always see things under the guise of our concepts.)  In short, perception is not like model 
theory (we don’t have to sort through various ‘conceptual models’ of a perceptual 
experience, as the model is the experience). 
 The fact that I argued that aspects of our concepts are embedded in the 
environment would seem to necessitate my stance on this issue.  For example, say that we 
see a deer in a field.  On my view, aspects of our ‘deer’ concept are embedded in the 
visual experience (we see antlers, and antlers are a part of our ‘deer’ concept).  It would 
seem to be inconsistent to make this claim and then hold that we don’t think our concepts 
(when we are consciously aware of them) in or with the visual object, as I would be 
claiming that (1) concepts are necessarily in experience (as aspects of our concepts are 
embedded in experience) and (2) concepts aren’t necessarily in experience (in the sense 
that we don’t think the concept associated with a visual object with the visual object 
itself).  
I argued that we can either consciously reflect on the concepts that are always 
already in experience or not.  Now, I pause to discuss an interesting possibility; namely, it 
may be possible to recreate Heidegger’s famous carpenter example from within the 
perspective of my view. 
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It seems plausible to hold that, when we lack conscious awareness of the concepts 
operating in perception, we have a circumstance where a conscious, reflective subject is 
not needed; we simply have a cognitive agent in direct, unreflective interaction with a 
meaningful world.  Here, there is no need for (conceptual) mental representations, for 
example.  Further, when we do have conscious use of (conceptual) mental 
representations, where we have a cognitive agent that is consciously and reflectively 
thinking about her perceptual experience through the guise of her concepts, it seems we 
do have a reflective subject (note that the notion of a reflective agent and the notion of a 
unified agent are two different things, i.e. this claim is not contradictory with the claims 
of the last section).  Further, it seems plausible to hold that perhaps a disturbance or 
malfunction of some sort, a situation in which the world is operating in an unexpected 
manner given our concepts, leads to the emergence of consciously manipulated 
(conceptual) mental representations, and hence to a reflective subject. 
 Or, to appeal to Heidegger’s carpenter example: when the carpenter is 
unreflectively engaged in the task of hammering nails, the carpenter is not a reflective 
subject.  The carpenter doesn’t have to think ‘hammer’ because she is using one.  Now, 
perhaps some malfunction occurs.  The carpenter then reflects consciously on the 
situation, i.e. the carpenter both sees a hammer and consciously thinks ‘hammer.’  In 
short, one can reformulate Heidegger’s critique of dualism from within the novel account 
(but in such a manner that the carpenter is unconsciously utilizing an object (that is 
standing in for a concept), rather than with a mere item of equipment).  
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5.4 EVIDENCE FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND NEUROSCIENCE 
The claim that we directly perceive the meaning of a perceptual object in the object itself 
(when both concept and visual object is present), and the claim that we don’t have to 
explicitly think a concept when the visual object that corresponds to the concept is 
present – suggests that there is an intimate relationship between perceptual experience 
and our conceptual or linguistic capacities.  In other words, if our linguistic or conceptual 
centers are (neurologically) intertwined with the processes that shape our direct 
perception, then it seems more plausible to claim that we perceive the sense of a 
perceptual object with the object, or that we don’t have to think a concept because it is 
present visually (i.e. the visual object can play a role in inferences).   
 There is a certain amount of scientific evidence that speaks to this intimate 
relationship between perception and the conceptual.  Gasser and Colunga (1997) offer 
evidence that points to a relationship between the particular language that we speak and 
the manner in which we perceive the world.  Experiments demonstrate that English and 
Chinese speakers, for example, perceive the world in a different manner (they pay 
attention to different objects and so on).  Experiments on bilinguals reveal the same 
circumstance.  One possible explanation for this fact is that a language may tie its 
speakers to particular contexts.  In short, in Gasser and Colunga’s (1997) work, we see 
evidence for the claim that there is an intimate link between perception and our 
conceptual abilities, and hence, evidence for several of the key claims of this thesis. 
 Also relevant here is the suspicion of many cognitive scientists that there is a 
profound and complex relationship between language and perception (see Miller and 
Johnson-Laird 1976, for example).  It is entirely plausible that before we get to a full-
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fledged visual experience, various mental processes and operations that deal with our 
conceptual apparatus play a role.   
5.5 SUMMARY 
 
The claims of this chapter and the previous chapter have gotten quite complex; I pause to 
offer a brief summary, or a synoptic view, of this chapter’s claims. 
 I formulated a view that I dubbed ‘conceptualized direct perception.’  Perception 
is direct (i.e. non-representational): sense data, (perceptual) mental representations, and 
the Cartesian Theater, which all rise and fall together, are rejected in favor of direct 
realism.  We see the world, not a picture or facsimile of the world (why represent a tree 
perceptually when there are trees in the world?). 
 Mental processes shape the way we see the world directly, that is, the fact that 
mental processes shape our perceptual experience does not imply that our perceptual 
experience is indirect, or is one step removed from the world.  So, we can reject sense 
data (etc) while still respecting the fact that mental processes shape the character of our 
perceptual experience. 
 Further, just as some mental processes shape the way we perceive motion, for 
example, other mental processes, processes concerned with our conceptual apparatus, 
also shape the way we directly perceive the world (these processes guide selective 
attention, for example).  It seems the arguments to the effect that perception is non-
conceptual do not stand up to scrutiny, and now, we can acknowledge the need for a 
meaning interface with the world (so as to explain intelligent behavior) while remaining 
in a direct perception framework.   
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 The world is conceptual in the sense that aspects of our concepts are embedded in 
the world.  Looking at a tree can be just as good as thinking ‘tree.’  (In the next chapter, 
we see that there are profound philosophical reasons for believing this to be the case.)  
So, for example, we can infer the proposition ‘there is bark’ from the visual appearance 
of a tree, just as we can infer the proposition ‘there is bark’ from the proposition ‘there is 
a tree.’ This view can account for why we don’t seem to need conscious access to our 
concepts while coping with the world (why think ‘tree’ when you’re looking at one?). 
 But, a common type of perceptual experience is one in which we have both the 
conscious use of concepts and the visual object, i.e. we both think ‘tree’ and look at a 
tree.  When this happens, we directly perceive the meaning or concept of the tree directly 
in or with the visual tree itself.  Perhaps a conscious use of concepts emerges in situations 
of malfunction (i.e. one can recreate Heidegger’s famous carpenter example from within 
the framework of my view)?  Cognitive science suggests that there is a close relationship 
between perception and the conceptual, as one would expect on my view. 
 To clarify my view with a concrete example: imagine that you are crossing the 
street as a car approaches.  First, you are looking at the car in the world, not a picture of 
the car.  You focus on the car, and not, say, on a bird flying overhead, because the car is 
more salient, and our concepts guide perception (i.e. give rise to intelligent behavior).  
But, you don’t need to consciously think ‘car’ because you are looking at one.  Now, 
there is something wrong: the car is moving faster than you expected.  You infer ‘I 
should walk faster’ directly from the visual experience, i.e. (1) you infer a proposition 
from a visual object (as the proposition ‘that car is moving too fast’ and the visual 
appearance of a speeding car are interchangeable), and (2) a disturbance or surprise leads 
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to the emergence of conceptual representations in conscious awareness.  You quickly 
walk to the other side of the street.  This easy flow between perception and the 
conceptual seems to be phenomenologically plausible, i.e. seems to accurately describe 
our experience of coping with the world.      
 Finally, allow me to note that a conceptual direct perception would be a sort of 
hybrid or mixture of Husserlian intentionality (or an intentionality where the intentional 
object is defined under the guise of a full fledged concept) and Heidegger’s Being-in-the-
World.  That is, we would have Heidegger’s direct immersion in the world, but this 
immersion would be one defined by Husserlian intentionality insofar as Dasein is 
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CHAPTER 6. HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER REVISITED  
 
I’ve argued for a ‘conceptualized direct perception,’ for a fusing of Being-in-the-World 
with Husserlian conceptual intentionality.  Of course, this synthesis contains aspects that 
both Husserl and Heidegger would find unappealing, to say the least.  Here, returning to 
the two figures with which this paper began, I briefly mention several of the most glaring 
problems. 
 With the synthesis’ emphasis on the world (‘we directly interact with a world that 
is conceptually defined’ etc), the world crashes through Husserl’s brackets, so to speak.  
That is, to clarify, any attempt to bracket out questions concerning the existence of the 
external world in the initial stages of investigation, so that one can conduct an 
investigation of a pure and self-sufficient consciousness, is abandoned.  In other words, 
the ‘phenomenological reduction’ is ignored.  In more modern terms, ‘methodological 
solipsism’ is abandoned.  Further, Husserl’s account of perception was altered: for 
example, contra Husserl, we encounter signitive representation in authentic appearance. 
 There are aspects of the novel view that Heidegger would dislike as well.  As 
Husserlian (conceptual or semantic) intentionality is now present at the most primary 
level of interaction with the world, there is no immediately evident place for Heidegger’s 
notion of equipment.  Heidegger’s notion of equipment played a key role in several 
aspects of Heidegger’s thought: in his departure from dualism and Husserl, in the ontic-
ontological distinction, his account of art and truth, his ideas on technology and so on.  It 
isn’t clear (to me, at least) what effect this rejection of Heidegger’s notion of equipment 
would have on Heidegger’s corpus as a whole, but it seems the effect would be 
significant. 
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 In short, in attempting to reconcile two such broadly opposed viewpoints, I have 
not surprisingly created a view that neither side would find satisfying.  Of course, this 
circumstance says nothing to the truth of my view.   
6.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
E. Husserl and M. Heidegger both put forth profound accounts of human cognition, 
accounts that took radical stands on important issues such as dualism, mental 
representationalism, the nature of perception, and consciousness.  There is a fundamental 
antagonism between the two views, an antagonism the reemerges in recent debates 
surrounding J. J. Gibson’s theory of direct perception, a theory that has a certain affinity 
with Heidegger’s perspective.  There is a connection between this debate and the current 
debate centering on the interaction between perceptual experience and our conceptual 
framework: if perceptual experience is necessarily conceptualized, then this can count as 
evidence for Husserl’s view (and provides Gibson’s critics with further ammunition), 
while if perception can proceed without concepts, then the gap where we have perception 
but not concepts would be the space in which Heidegger’s notion of instrumentality (and 
Gibson’s notion of affordance) would operate (key to this claim was the perhaps 
controversial claim that in order for Dasein to engage in practical activity, Dasein must at 
least open its eyes).  Arguments can be formulated for and against both sides, so perhaps 
a synthesis is in order?   
I formulated and argued for one possible synthesis: a conceptualized direct 
perception, where our interaction with the world is a more basic, more Heideggerian (and 
Gibsonian) affair, but one in which our concepts are implicated.  While this perspective 
would not be pleasing to either Husserl or Heidegger, as the phenomenological reduction 
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is ignored, and there is no immediately evident place for Heidegger’s notion of 
equipment, it would sit well with the work of J. McDowell, who holds that experience is 
conceptual so as to make empirical judgments possible in the wake of Sellars’ critique of 
the Myth of the Given. 
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